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In the wake of the subprime housing crisis, 
there are indications that subprime credit 
cards may be the next turbulent sector. Ac-
cording to Federal Reserve statistics, credit 
card  charge-offs  (loans  removed  from  the 
books and declared a loss) rose almost three-
quarters of a percent during the first quar-
ter of 2008 up to a level of 3.94.1 At the 
100 largest banks, delinquencies increased 
from 4.24 percent to 4.47 percent (the ra-
tio of loans 30 days or more overdue to to-
tal loans). At the same time, credit card gi-
ant  Capital  One  Financial  Corp.  cut  its 
fourth quarter earnings estimate and report-
ed a $1.9 billion provision for losses from 
loans. HSBC Holdings plc. took a $1.4 bil-
lion charge on its American consumer-fi-
nance business, which was partly attribut-
able to weakness in the credit card sector.2 
Even American Express, which boasts the 
most affluent customer base, took a fourth 
quarter charge for rising delinquencies and 
charge-offs.3 
Subprime Borrowers
Despite these potentially threatening signs, 
the  market  research  groups  Synovate  and 
Mintel note that card companies are active-
ly courting subprime customers. (See “Who 
Is a Subprime Borrower?”) During the lat-
ter half of 2007 credit card companies in-
creased solicitations to subprime borrowers 
by 41 percent.4 
Industry  observers  worry  that  these 
people will accept the credit card offers be-
cause they can no longer use the equity in 
their homes for cash, given declining hous-
ing values. That could spell trouble for cred-
it card issuers and the markets as a whole. 
Similar to mortgages, credit card loans are 
organized into categories by risk level, pack-
aged, sold and resold as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs). If consumers were to 
become delinquent in large numbers, the 
value of these obligations would decrease, 
potentially  leading  to  investment  loss-
es similar to those experienced within the 
mortgage industry. In fact, in the case of 
mortgage CDOs, even the perception that 
mortgages might be delinquent has reduced 
the value.
Subprime Credit Card 
Business Model
After the recent subprime mortgage debacle, 
it may seem surprising that credit card com-
panies heavily solicit subprime consumers.   
Industry insiders argue, however, that the 
subprime credit card business differs from 
the subprime mortgage business in the way 
it is structured, and a confluence of events 
could make subprime consumers an attrac-
tive and profitable customer base. 
Initially, credit cards had fixed rates of 
around 20 percent and few fees.5 But today 
many card issuers embrace a practice called 
risk-based pricing. Cards have more diverse 
interest rates and higher fees depending on 
cardholder  creditworthiness.  According  to 
data reported to the U.S. Government Ac-
counting Office in 2005, about 80 percent of 
credit card accounts have interest rates of less 
than 20 percent; 40 percent have rates be-
low 15 percent. However, card companies as-
sessed late fees on 35 percent of accounts and 
over-limit fees on 13 percent of accounts. 
All  cardholders  are  affected  to  some 
degree by risk-based pricing, but subprime 
consumers  are  most  adversely  affected. 
Companies charge them high up-front fees 
and provide small credit limits. Some of the 
cards in the subprime category allow credit 
of only $250.6 Card issuers immediately de-
plete cardholder credit availability by charg-
ing a number of fees. On a credit limit of 
$250, a cardholder may be left with only 
$71 in available credit. (See “Fees for Issu-
ance or Availability of Credit.”)
These types of cards are profitable for 
several reasons. Low credit limits ensure that 
card companies don’t incur great risk on cus-
tomers with poor credit histories. High up-
front fees mean that even if customers de-
fault on some of the debt, the card company 
will still have taken in money. And they may 
earn extra money from credit insurance. In 
that line of business, borrowers pay a per-
centage of their balance to the card company 
on a monthly basis in exchange for the right 
to freeze or suspend the obligation to pay the 
card balance in prescribed circumstances. 
To address complaints from consum-
ers, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
made several proposed rule changes in both 
2007 and May 2008. The proposed rules 
include changes to Regulation Z, which en-
forces the Truth in Lending Act, and com-
plementary  revisions  to  Regulation  AA, 
which prohibits unfair and deceptive prac-
tices.7 For instance, if a card issuer imposes 
required fees in exchange for a credit card, 
and if the total of those fees equals 25 per-
cent or more of the minimum credit limit 
offered on the card, then the card company 
would have to include a table outlining the 
remaining available credit. That and other 
changes to the regulation of open-end cred-
it are pending, but in general they aim to 
ensure that the terms of the credit offer are 
“clear and conspicuous.”8  
The 2005 Bankruptcy Law
Another reason that credit card companies 
are willing to lend to subprime borrowers 
relates to recent changes to federal bank-
ruptcy laws. In 2005, Congress enacted the 
Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and  Con-
sumer Protection Act. Debtors who make 
above their state’s median income and have 
extra money after allowable expenses must 
repay some of their debt even if they enter 
bankruptcy. The law is more stringent than 
the older law, which allowed a bankruptcy 
judge to decide who could walk away from 
their debt.
That  change  opened  a  new  market-
ing opportunity for credit card companies 
because the law makes it more likely that 
Fees for Issuance or Availability of Credit: 
An Example
Available Credit on Card      $250
Account Set-up Fee      $29 (one-time fee)
Program Fee        $95 (one-time fee)
Annual Fee        $48
Monthly Servicing Fee      $ 7 (x 12 months is $84 in a year)
Total Fees        $179
Credit Left After Fees      $71Communities & Banking    23
debtors  will  repay  their  credit  card  debt 
even after they seek bankruptcy protection. 
To assess just how likely, the risk-assessment 
company Fair Isaac has developed a FICO 
Bankruptcy  Risk  Score  that  “rank-orders 
consumers  according  to  the  likely  bank-
ruptcy loss ratio (bankruptcy losses divided 
by revenue) each consumer represents to a 
credit grantor.”9 
This dynamic may at least partly explain 
the increase in solicitations to subprime bor-
rowers. Observers have also noted that be-
cause home values are decreasing and offer 
less equity to tap, borrowers who do not have 
enough money to pay both their mortgage 
and their credit card bill may be more will-
ing to pay the latter. Borrowers are beginning 
to reason that because they owe more than 
the house is worth, it is better to maintain 
an easy source of credit than to keep a house 
that they cannot afford anyway. 
However,  if  housing  pressures  con-
tinue to plague the economy or if the na-
tion enters a recession, subprime borrowers 
may begin to have trouble even if they make 
credit card payments in a timely manner. 
Credit card companies that consider these 
borrowers a delinquency risk may exercise 
their right under the card agreement to in-
crease interest rates, reduce the credit limit, 
or close a consumer account entirely, which 
would further deteriorate a subprime cus-
tomer’s credit score and cause other card is-
suers to take similar steps. Thus, while credit 
cards are a valuable financial tool, consum-
ers must understand their card agreements 
so that they are aware of all the ramifica-
tions of credit card usage.   
Margo Anderson is an assistant examiner at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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